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Hymowitz and Richardson: Updates from the International Criminal Courts

UPDATES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
THE PROSECUTOR V. MILORAD
KRNOJELAC, CASE NO. IT-97- 25-I
After hearing the dispositions of both parties,
the Appeals Chamber for the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
( I C TY) entered a judgment increasing the sentence of Milorad Krnojelac from seven to fifteen
years.
Milorad Krnojelac was the commander of
the Foca Kazneno-Popravni (KP Dom), one of
largest prisons in the former Yugoslavia. During
the Serbian occupation of Foca city, where KP
Dom is located, the military police rounded up
hundreds of Muslims and other non-Serbs and
illegally detained them. From 1992-1994, with
Krnojelac at the helm, the KP Dom prison was
home to acts of tort u re, beatings, countless
killings, forced labor, inhumane conditions, and
racial, political, and religious persecution.
Additionally, Krnojelac assisted in the deport ation and expulsion of the majority of Muslim
and non-Serb males from the Foca municipality.
Due to these acts and his role as commander
of the KP Dom, on June 6, 1997, Krnojelac was
indicted for crimes against humanity, grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws or customs of war. On March
15, 2002, the Trial Chamber found Krnojelac
guilty of crimes against humanity, specifically
persecution and inhumane acts, and guilty of a
violation of the laws and customs of war, part i cularly cruel treatment. The Trial Chamber
acquitted Krnojelac of six counts, including the
crimes against humanity of tort u re, murder,
imprisonment, and inhumane acts, as well as of
c e rtain violations of the laws or customs of war.
Both Krnojelac and the Prosecutor appealed this
decision.
Appeal of Krnojelac
Krnojelac presented six grounds for appeal
including an appeal of the sentence. The Appeals
Chamber dismissed as unlawful three of these
g rounds, which alleged errors of fact due to a
failure to meet the burden of proof. Krnojelac’s
second ground of appeal alleged that the Trial
Chamber made an error of law when it found
him guilty of aiding and abetting through his
role in persecution via the imprisonment of non-

Serb civilian detainees and the living conditions
then imposed upon them. The Ap p e a l s
Chamber, finding the Trial Chamber applied the
correct criterion in evaluating the elements of
this crime, rejected this ground of appeal. After
re v i ewing Kronjelac’s other grounds for appeal,
the Appeals Chamber found him guilty as a
superior for inhumane acts and cruel treatment
for the beatings that took place at KP Dom.
Appeal of the Prosecutor
The Prosecutor presented seven grounds for
appeal. First, the Prosecutor asserted that the
Trial Chamber erred as a matter of law in its definition of the legal responsibility arising fro m
p a rticipation in a joint criminal enterprise.
According to the Prosecutor, had the definition
of joint criminal enterprise been applied corre c tly, Krnojelac would have been found guilty as a
co-perpetrator and not as an aider or abettor for
the crimes of persecution (imprisonment and
inhumane acts) and cruel treatment (living conditions). The Appeal Chamber agreed and
re versed the relevant parts of the Trial Chamber
judgment, finding Krnojelac guilty as a co-perpetrator in persecution and cruel treatment.
The Appeals Chamber rejected the
Prosecutor’s second ground for appeal, which
alleged that the Trial Chamber erred in its interpretation of the law when it re q u i red that the
Indictment refer to an “extended form” of joint
criminal enterprise.
On the third ground for appeal, the Appeals
Chamber found that the Trial Chamber erred in
concluding that Krnojelac did not know or have
reason to know that his subordinates we re torturing the detainees. Due to this erro r, the Trial
Chamber refused to hold Krnojelac responsible
under Article 7(3) of the Statute of the ICTY,
which re q u i res personal knowledge of tort u re
for a conviction. The Appeals Chamber
re versed, stating that the evidence clearly established Krnojelac’s knowledge of the torture of
the detainees and there f o re he was liable under
A rticle 7(3). In a related appeal, the Appeals
Chamber also found that Krnojelac had sufficient information to put him on notice that his
subordinates were involved in the murder of
detainees at the KP Dom, re versing the Trial
Chamber ve rdict. The Appeals Chamber noted
that for both charges the evidence proved
Krnojelac was aware of the widespread beatings
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and frequent interrogations taking place at KP
Dom. The Appeals Chamber stated that “he
had witnessed beatings, was aware of suspicious
disappearances, and had seen the bullet impacts
in the walls.”
The Appeals Chamber also found that the
Trial Chamber erred when it determined that the
beatings constituting inhumane acts were not
perpetrated on discriminatory grounds. This had
precluded the Trial Chamber from holding
Krnojelac responsible for the crime of persecution. The Appeals Chamber noted that
Krnojelac knew about the unlawful detention of
non-Serbs at KP Dom when he accepted the role
of commander. Further, the Appeals Chamber
held he was specifically aware of the mistre a tment that occurred during his time as prison
warden. This behavior satisfied the central elements of the ICTY definition of persecution—
the deprivation of fundamental rights on discriminatory grounds.
Again finding an error in the Trial Chamber’s
analysis of persecution, the Appeals Chamber
re versed the decision regarding the charge of
forced labor, finding Kronjelac guilty as a co-perpetrator in a joint criminal enterprise of exploiting non-Serb detainees through forced labor.
Finally, the Appeals Chamber found that it was
unreasonable for the Trial Chamber to conclude
that there was no evidence that the transfer of
thirty-five detainees to Montenegro, as well as
other displacements, had been carried out on the
requisite discriminatory grounds. Finding that
there was sufficient evidence to establish persecution, the Appeals Chamber found Krnojelac
responsible as a co-perpetrator.
Conclusion
As noted above, the Appeals Chamber ove rturned many of the Trial Chamber’s findings,
and its opinion often chastised the Trial
Chamber for a misapplication of the law or an
incorrect analysis of the facts. As it expanded
Krnojelac’s liability, the Court signaled a willingness to expand the boundaries of the crime of
persecution to include a greater range of acts. It
also clearly defined the minimum levels of participation to constitute persecution. Because the
Appeals Chamber establishes precedent for both
the ICTY and ICTR, this decision may have farranging implications for the charge of persecution at both tribunals.
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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA (ICTR)
PROSECUTOR V. LAURENT SEMANZA,
CASE NO. ICTR-97-20-T
On May 15, 2003, Trial Chamber III of the
ICTR delivered its judgment in the case of
Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza. The (third)
amended indictment charged Semanza with
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, crimes
against humanity in the form of extermination,
persecution, rape, murder, torture, and serious
violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
C o n ventions and Protocol.
Semanza was charged with both individual
and superior criminal responsibility, pursuant to
A rticles 2(3) and 6(1), and for ordering under
A rticle 6(3) of the ICTR Statute. He was convicted of complicity in genocide; aiding and abetting
extermination as a crime against humanity; rape,
torture, and murder as crimes against humanity;
as well as an individual act of murder. The Trial
Chamber sentenced Semanza to twenty-four
years and six months imprisonment.
Analysis
Be t ween April 1, 1994 and July 31, 1994,
the period during which the violations of international humanitarian law referred to in the
indictment occurred, there we re widespre a d
attacks against the ethnic Tutsis in Rwanda.
Laurent Semanza served in the transitional parliament during this time. The court found that
he did not have de jure authority over militiamen and that he did not exercise de facto authority based upon his influence in the community.
In order to show a superior-subordinate relationship, evidence of a formal or informal hierarchical relationship involving an accused’s effective
control over the direct perpetrators must be
introduced. A simple showing of an accused’s
influence in the community is not sufficient to
establish a superior-subordinate relationship.
Thus, the Trial Chamber held that Semanza
could not be responsible for the crimes charged
in the Indictment under ordering.
Semanza was convicted of complicity in
genocide (Count 3) and of aiding and abetting
extermination as a crime against humanity
(Count 5). The Chamber found that in addition
to having knowledge of the genocidal intent of
the principal perpetrators at the various massacre
sites, Semanza possessed an independent intent
to destroy the Tutsi ethnic group. Semanza’s specific intent to aid and abet in the commission of
genocide was inferred by the Chamber through
his actions and words. By his actions of bringing

soldiers, as well as Interahamwe (“those who
work together”), a faction of Rwandan rebels, to
massacre sites to assist in the killings, Semanza
was deemed criminally responsible for complicity in genocide and for aiding and abetting the
principal perpetrators who killed members of the
Tutsi ethnic group.
The Chamber also found Semanza guilty of
rape, torture, and murder as crimes against
humanity. The rape conviction is premised on
the defendant’s instigation of a crowd to rape
Tutsi women before killing them. The Trial
Chamber determined that Semanza’s instigation
in the rape of the Tutsi women due to their ethnicity was also sufficient as an act to constitute
the crime of tort u re. The analysis stated that
because he was encouraging a crowd to inflict
severe physical or mental pain or suffering for
discriminatorypurposes, the one act met the elements of both crimes. Semanza was found not
guilty of persecution, as the Trial Chamber interpreted the ICTR Statute to prohibit this crime
from being based on ethnic discrimination.
Semanza was convicted of a separate count of
murder as a crime against humanity based on his
instigation of a group of Interahamwe resulting
in six deaths.
Counts 7, 9, and 13 charged Semanza with
serious violations of Common Article 3 and the
Additional Protocol under Article 4 of the ICTR
Statute. In order to meet the burden of proof,
the Prosecutor proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that: (1) a non-international armed conflict existed on the territory of the concerned
state; (2) that the victims were not taking part in
the hostilities at the time of the alleged violation;
and (3) that a nexus existed between the
accused’s alleged crimes and the non-international armed conflict.
The Trial Chamber found Semanza notguilty of outrages upon personal dignity, in particular in the form of humiliating and degrading
treatment, rape, forced prostitution, and any
form of indecent assault because the Prosecutor
failed to introduce sufficient evidence of the
alleged acts of rape and sexual violence. No conviction was entered for Count 13, violence to
life, health and physical well-being of persons,
specifically murder, as well as cruel treatment
such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment.
Sentence and Appeal
Semanza was sentenced to twenty-four years
and six months imprisonment, the initial 25
years being reduced by 5 months to compensate
for violations of his right to be pro m p t l y
informed of the charges against him during his
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pre-trial detention. Therefore, as of May 15,
2003, there remain seventeen years, four
months, and eleven days to be served. On May
29, 2003, Laurent Semanza filed a motion in
which he was seeking an extension to file his
Notice of Appeal of the judgment entered
against him.
Conclusion
The Trial Chamber decided not to expand
the bounds of the charge of persecution to
encompass Semanza’s acts against an ethnic
group. Im p o rtantly though, the decision is a
strong statement against torture, the Chamber
did find that Semanza’s acts of incitement to rape
were sufficient to constitute both the crimes of
both rape and tort u re. Generally, this conviction
represents a step towards the ICTR’s goal of preventing impunity. By convicting superior officers
and those seen as officials in their community,
the Tribunal goes beyond the primary actors and
expands the reach of justice. HRB
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